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FILLING FEDERAL COURT VACANCIES IN A
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEAR
Carl Tobias *
Scholars and politicians who closely track the federal judicial
selection process appreciate that confirmations slow and ulti-
mately halt over presidential election years, a phenomenon which
has greater salience in a chief executive's last administration.
That policy comprises numerous strands. Important are the con-
ventions-which have permitted the approval of many superb,
uncontroversial district court nominees routinely through the fall
of most presidential election years and in certain lame duck ses-
sions-while allowing a number of capable, mainstream appellate
nominees to manage consideration until the August Recess. The
traditions derive from respect for voters' preferences expressed in
the elections, the incoming chief executive, who should have the
opportunity to fill vacant judicial posts, and new senators, who
must discharge their constitutional responsibility to provide ad-
vice and consent on selections.
Nevertheless, GOP members have not always followed these
customs and other venerable conventions throughout President
Barack Obama's years. For instance, Republicans automatically
hold over Judiciary Committee votes on able, moderate candi-
dates for a week, and the GOP leadership denied talented, cen-
trist appeals court nominees' final ballots after mid-June 2012.
Ever since winning the upper chamber in November 2014, Repub-
licans have incessantly promised to duly effectuate "regular or-
der" again.1 However, the Senate confirmed merely eleven jurists
in 2015, which is the fewest since Dwight Eisenhower was Presi-
* Williams Chair in Law, University of Richmond. Thanks to Peggy Sanner and
Katie Lehnen for fine ideas, Leslee Stone for excellent processing as well as Russell Wil-
liams and the Hunton Williams Summer Endowment Fund for generous, continuing sup-
port. Remaining errors are mine.
1. See infra Part I.B.
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dent.2 Because the United States in fact confronts seventy-one
openings (thirty-two "judicial emergencies"), which plainly un-
dermine the delivery of justice, and the GOP will keep stalling
and ignoring customs applied over presidential election years,
2016 court appointments merit scrutiny.
The first section of this article canvasses selection in Obama's
tenure, ascertaining that Republicans cooperated little and con-
travened numerous traditions, especially after the party captured
a majority. Thus, section two analyzes why the GOP did not col-
laborate and the consequences. Because that obstruction-which
undercuts justice and regard for the coequal branches of govern-
ment-will actually continue across 2016, the piece surveys de-
vices, which could rectify or ameliorate those critical impacts this
presidential election year.
I. JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
A. The First Six Years
Selection proceeded well Obama's first term and a half when
Democrats controlled the Senate, particularly in contrast to 2015.
He aggressively consulted home state politicians, seeking their
guidance and requesting proposals of fine, mainstream candi-
dates, advice which Obama usually followed.3 These endeavors
promote cooperation, as senators defer to colleagues in jurisdic-
tions with vacancies because of mutual respect, and they can and
do halt processing by not returning blue slips-a tradition which
permits consideration to advance. Despite solicitous, persistent
White House cultivation of all lawmakers, many failed to coordi-
nate, slowly adopting processes or submitting prospects, while
some have not even tendered picks.4
2. Jennifer Bendery, Congratulations, GOP. You're Confirming Judges at the Slowest
Rate in 60 Years, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/entry/obama-judicial-nominations_55faced7e4b08820d9178a5c.
3. Carl Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2233, 2239-40 (2013) [hereinafter Tobias, Senate Gridlock]; see Sheldon Goldman et
al., Obama's First Term Judiciary: Picking Judges in the Minefields of Obstructionism, 97
JUDICATURE 7, 13-16 (2013).
4. Goldman et al., supra note 3, at 17; Texas: State of Judicial Emergency, ALLIANCE
FOR JUSTICE, http://www.ai.org/our-work/issues/judicial-selection/texas-epicenter-of-the-
judicial-vacancy-crisis (last visited Jan. 4, 2016); see also 161 CONG. REC. S6151 (daily ed.
July 30, 2015) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
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Republicans cooperated with the Democratic majority in swiftly
arranging committee hearings at which five nominees testified
every three weeks, carefully questioning them in the panel ses-
sions and effectively posing later written queries when indicated.5
However, the GOP automatically held over discussions and com-
mittee votes one week for all choices recommended but fifteen of
350 excellent, moderate nominees.6
Republicans slowly agreed to most possibilities' chamber de-
bates, if warranted, and yes or no ballots, requiring exceptional,
consensus selections to languish across months until Democrats
petitioned for cloture.7 Republicans also demanded roll call votes
and numerous debate minutes yet used virtually none for superi-
or, uncontroversial prospects, many of whom captured appoint-
ment without opposition, thereby needlessly consuming precious
Senate floor time.8 Those procedures stalled confirmations and
meant openings remained close to ninety for much of the half
decade following August 2009, numbers that were unprecedent-
ed.9
In the 2012 presidential election year, these strategies contin-
ued and increased.'" The GOP regularly held over committee dis-
cussions and ballots for one week, rejected prompt floor vote con-
cords, and mandated roll call ballots for accomplished, noncontro-
versial designees who easily secured confirmation, while final ap-
pellate votes ceased in mid-June." With Obama's re-election,
Democrats hoped that Republicans would actually enhance col-
laboration, but they did not, and this recalcitrance culminated in
5. Goldman et al., supra note 3, at 16-17; Tobias, Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at
2242-43.
6. It found most fine. Tobias, Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at 2242-43. Six of the
fifteen were for the Arizona District that was an emergency. Carl Tobias, Filling the Dis-
trict of Arizona Vacancies, 56 ARIz. L. REV. SYLLABUS 5, 5-6 (2014) [hereinafter Tobias,
Arizona Vacancies].
7. Goldman et al., supra note 3, at 26-29; Tobias, Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at
2243-46.
8. Tobias, Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at 2244; see also Juan Williams, The GOP's
Judicial Logjam, THE HILL (July 27, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/juan-will
iams/249196-juan-williams-the-gops-judicial-logjam (discussing Republican obstruction of
judicial confirmations).
9. U.S. COURTS, ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES (2009-14), http://www.uscourts.
gov/judges-judgeships/judicialvacanciesarchive-judicial-vacancies; see infra note 44 and
accompanying text.
10. Tobias, Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at 2246; supra notes 6-8 and accompanying
text; infra note 24 and accompanying text.
11. Tobias, Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at 2252.
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June 2013 when he proffered three well qualified, mainstream,
diverse recommendations for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, the nation's second most important
court." The GOP refused each a floor ballot, and frustration with
incessant obstruction provoked Democrats to cautiously exercise
the "nuclear option," which limited filibusters.13 The measure's
November 2013 implementation, which Republicans asserted vio-
lated tradition, enabled the 113th Congress to approve 134 ju-
rists, including twenty-seven persons in the 2014 lame duck ses-
sion.4 After that mechanism's explosion, Republicans forced
Democrats to invoke cloture on all nominees until 2015.1"
B. Selection in 2015
Once the GOP became the majority," this lack of cooperation
persisted and eclipsed that when Republicans were the minority.
The leadership has constantly said that it would dutifully restore
the world's greatest deliberative body to regular order."7 Members
duly recited this litany to describe reinstitution of the normal
processes which ostensibly governed the chamber before Demo-
crats subverted them. Early in January 2015, Mitch McConnell
(R-Ky.), the new Majority Leader, proclaimed: "We need to return
to regular order,"'" and he directly reiterated that phrase over
12. See Carl Tobias, Filling the D.C. Circuit Vacancies, 91 IND. L.J. 121 (2015); Jeffrey
Toobin, The Obama Brief, NEW YORKER (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/mag
azine/2014/10/27/obama-brief.
13. Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger 'Nuclear' Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters
on Nominees, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.comlpolitics/sen
ate-control-at-stake-in-todays-midterm-elections/201411/04/e882353e-642c-1le4-bbl4-4cf
eale742d5_story.html.
14. U.S. COURTS, ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES (2013-14), http://www.uscourts.
gov/judges-judgeships/judicialvacanciesarchive-judicial-vacancies.
15. 161 CONG. REC. S3223 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy); Carl
Tobias, Judicial Selection in Congress'Lame Duck Session, 90 IND. L.J. SUPP. 52, 56 (2015)
[hereinafter Tobias, Lame Duck Session].
16. Jerry Markon et al., Republicans Win Senate Control as Polls Show Dissatisfac-
tion with Obama, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.comlpolitics
senate-control-at-stake-intodays-midterm-eections/2014/1 1/04/e882353e-642c-11 e4-bb14-
4cfeale742d5_story.html; Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, Riding Wave of Discon-
tent, G.O.P. Takes Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com2014111/05/
us/politics/midterm-elections.html.
17. See, e.g., 160 CONG. REC. S4679, S4681 (daily ed. July 22, 2014) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) ("It is past time to restore the Senate's rightful place in our constitutional order.").
18. 161 CONG. REC. S28 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2015).
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subsequent months.19 Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), the Judiciary
Committee Chair, propounded analogous views. Emblematic was
his January 21 statement hat the Committee would deploy regu-
lar order in assessing judicial nominees.20 Despite many pledges,
the GOP has failed to expeditiously offer suggestions for presi-
dential review, committee hearings and ballots or chamber floor
debates, when required, and final votes.
1. The District Court Process
a. The Nomination Process
Obama has continued to assiduously consult, seeking proposals
from home state officers about well qualified, consensus picks,
which he normally used by selecting them, as moderation and
competence are Obama district possibilities' hallmarks.21 Not-
withstanding his insistent cultivation of all legislators, many Re-
publicans have declined to coordinate, slowly establishing proce-
dures or forwarding candidates, and a few have chosen none."2
Thirty-six in forty-three (eight of nine appeals courts) openings
lacking nominees and eighteen in twenty-one vacancies without
them-which the U.S. Courts Administrative Office ("AO") duti-
fully classifies emergencies-are currently in jurisdictions that at
least one GOP senator represents.3
19. Id. at S155 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 2015); id. at S2767 (daily ed. May 12, 2015). This
approach has encountered some criticism from across the aisle. See, e.g., id. at S2949 (dai-
ly ed. May 18, 2015) (statement of Sen. Reid); id. at S3223 (statement of Sen. Leahy). Oth-
er commentators have noticed the decline in judicial confirmations as well. Jim Manley,
Has the Senate Really Turned a Corner?, WALL ST. J., (June 24, 2015) http:/fblogs.wsj.com
/washwire/2015/06/24Ihas-the-senate-really-turned-a-corner/.
20. See Hearing on Judicial Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
114th Cong. (Jan. 21, 2015) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley) [hereinafter Jan. 21 Hear-
ing]; David Catanese, Chuck Grassley's Gavel Year, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 28,
2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/O1/28/chuck-grassleys-gavel-year (stat-
ing Grassley's desire to maintain traditional protocol for nominations). But see 161 CONG.
REC. S6151 (daily ed. July 30, 2015) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
21. Most Presidents tap able centrists. Goldman et al., supra note 3, at 15-17; Tobias,
Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at 2240.
22. Goldman et al., supra note 3, at 17; ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 4.
23. U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL VACANCIES: JUDICIAL EMERGENCIES (2015), http://
www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/udicial-emergencies; U.S. SENATE,
SENATORS OF THE 114TH CONGRESS (2015), http:/www.senate.gov/senators/contact. The
AO, the administrative arm of the federal courts, premises emergencies on dockets' large
magnitude and vacancies' protracted length. Judicial Emergency Definition, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicialvacancies/archive-judicialvacancies/jud
icial-emergencies/judicial-emergency-definition (last visited Jan. 4, 2016).
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The clearest example is Texas, which has the most U.S. open-
ings, notwithstanding approval of three excellent, uncontroversial
jurists by May 2015. It presently faces two circuit and seven dis-
trict court vacancies, all lacking nominees with eight comprising
emergencies, and for many of which the recommendation process
has yet to begin or has stalled.24 Texas is not alone. Most crucial
are Pennsylvania's two empty Third Circuit seats and Western
District openings in three of ten positions without nominees for
multiple years,25 while Georgia had two unfilled Eleventh Circuit
slots and the Northern District had a third of posts vacant several
years before politicians reached a "deal" with Obama to fill
them."6
b. The Confirmation Process
i. Judiciary Committee Hearings
Similar, but exacerbated, problems infect confirmations. Grass-
ley set the first hearing on January 21, 2015, promising he would
analyze strong, mainstream nominees under regular order." The
Chair alleged the public should expect no "discernible difference"
between how the panel operates with GOP rather than Democrat-
ic leadership, suggesting it would provide hearings every few
weeks that Congress was in session, a policy ex-Chair Patrick
Leahy (D-Vt.) ably instituted the last three Congresses and
24. ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 4; accord, 161 CONG. REC. S2104 (daily ed. Apr.
13, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy). This derives from senators' slow responses to current
vacancies and not foreseeing future ones, slow selection panel scrutiny, differences on
picks among Democratic House members and between them and the senators and slow
White House action. But see Sylvan Lane, Senate Fills South Texas Judgeship; First Con-
firmation Since GOP Takeover, DALL. MORNING NEWS: TRAIL BLAZERS BLOG (Apr. 13,
2015, 6:10 PM), http://trailblazersblog.dallasnews.com/2015/04/senate-fills.south-texas-jud
geship-first-confirmation-since-gop-takeover.htmll.
25. U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL VACANCIES: CURRENT JUDICIAL VACANCIES (2015), http://
www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/udicial-vacancies/current-judicial-vacancies.
26. Id. (2011-14); see Tobias, Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at 2261; Lauren French,
Lewis Opposes Boggs Nomination, POLITICO (May 19, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/
2014/05/john-lewis-michael-boggs-oppose-judge-nomination-georgia-106839; Dan Malloy,
The Delegation Georgians in D.C.; Woodall Does Balancing Act in House GOP Post,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 20, 2014, at 14A.




Grassley, the Ranking Member over the 112th and 113th, helped
effectuate.2' Disparities rapidly materialized, however. For in-
stance, the next hearing occurred seven weeks after the first and
the third eight weeks later, while the fourth and fifth came in
June and July with the latest on September 30, October 21, and
December 9.9 The March hearing was conducted for a pair of
nominees and the summer hearings for three each, in comparison
with the five Leahy typically evaluated."
In the April 20 debate on a Texas re-nominee, Grassley pro-
claimed Republicans matched the Democratically led Senate over
President George W. Bush's seventh year,3 ' because at the identi-
cal juncture, the "committee had held three nominee hearings for
a total of 10 judges," while the panel "already held 4 nomination
hearings" [on] 6 judges.12 Harry Reid (D-Nev.), the Minority Lead-
er, countered that the 2015 panel was "not having any hearings
to speak of;" by June 8, 2007, "Democrats confirmed 18 judges, in-
cluding 3 circuit court judges."3
ii. Judiciary Committee Discussions and Votes
Despite Grassley's pledges, which he repeated at the February
12 meeting, the Chair held over votes from that session until Feb-
ruary 26,14 retaining a practice the GOP used during Obama's
28. Compare Jan. 21, 2015 Hearing, supra note 20, with Hearings on Judicial Nomi-
nees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (Jan. 23, Feb. 13, 2013, Jan. 8, 28,
2014); see Catanese, supra note 20.
29. Hearing on Judicial Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong.
(Mar. 11, 2015); id. (May 6, 2015); id. (June 10, 2015); id. (July 22, 2015); id. (Sept. 30,
2015); id. (Oct. 21, 2015; id. (Dec. 9, 2015).
30. Compare Hearings on Judicial Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
114th Cong. (Mar. 11, June 10, July 22, 2015), with Hearings on Judicial Nominees Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (Jan. 28, Sept. 9, 2014); see supra text accom-
panying note 24 (noting many senators' failure to tender picks for judicial nomination).
31. 161 CONG. REC. S2264 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 2015).
32. Id. He said four executive nominees, including for Attorney General, testified and
that Obama's nominees had been treated "extremely fairly," as he named 309 judges ver-
sus 273 for Bush. Id. But see supra note 29, infra notes 33, 42, 44, 52.
33. 161 CONG. REC. S3850 (daily ed. June 8, 2015). But see supra notes 28, 31-32 and
accompanying text.
34. Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th. Cong.
(Feb. 26, 2015) [hereinafter Feb. 26 Executive Business Meeting]; see also Executive Busi-
ness Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th. Cong. (Feb. 12, 2015); Josh
Voorhees, Procedural Purgatory, SLATE (Mar. 29, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news-and-politics/politics/2015/03loretta-jynch-sonfirmation-mitch-mcconnell-and-the-
gophavedelayed itbut.html; supra text accompanying note 20.
2016]
42 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 50:35
first term and a half.35 Those delayed were five superb, moderate
U.S. Court of Federal Claims re-nominees whom the panel duly
reported last year on unopposed voice votes36 and four superior,
consensus district re-nominees, two for emergencies, with power-
ful support of the Republican party home state panel members:
John Cornyn, Ted Cruz, Orrin Hatch, and Mike Lee.7
iii. Floor Debates and Votes
McConnell concurred on few quick nominee debates and votes
when he was the Minority Leader Obama's initial six years,"8 thus
requiring Democrats to pursue cloture on numerous selections
and eventually change filibusters.9 However, McConnell pledged
additional cooperation in his new role as Majority Leader, while
scheduling nominee floor debates and chamber ballots afforded a
constructive opportunity for respecting this promise."
Nevertheless, McConnell actually set no fast consideration on
the four districts, and the five Claims Court, re-nominees whom
the panel approved with February 26 voice votes. A month later,
he finally convened a lone district re-nominee's April 13 floor de-
bate and ballot." This seemingly treated the contention by Leahy,
35. See, e.g., Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th.
Cong. (Sept. 11, 2014); Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
114th. Cong. (Nov. 13, 2014); see also supra note 6.
36. Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th. Cong.
(Nov. 20, 2014); see also supra note 24.
37. Jan. 21, 2015 Hearing, supra note 20 (showing four District Judge nominees on
the agenda); Feb. 26 Executive Business Meeting, supra note 34 (voting on judicial nomi-
nees). Grassley eschewed weekly meetings, unlike Leahy. See, e.g., Executive Business
Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (June 12, 19, 26, 2014) (provid-
ing statements from Leahy during weekly meetings).
38. 158 CONG. REC. S8375 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2012) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see To-
bias, Senate Gridlock, supra note 3; Burgess Everett & Seung Min Kim, Judge Not: GOP
Blocks Dozens of Obama Court Picks, POLITICO (July 6, 2015), http://www.politico.com/
story/2015/07/payback-gop-blocks-obama-judge-picks-judiciary-119743.
39. 159 CONG. REC. S8418 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013); see Jeffrey Toobin, Reid Changed
the Federal Courts, NEW YORKER (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/how-harry-reid-changed-the-federal-courts; Carl Hulse, Reid to Retire from Senate in
2016, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/O3/28/us/politics/senator-
harry-reid-retire.html.
40. See Neil Eggleston, Judicial Nominations: Accomplishments and the Work that
Lies Ahead, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Dec. 17, 2014, 3:39 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/2014/12/17/judicial-nominations-accomplishments-and-work-lies-ahead.
41. The delay troubled Leahy, as the GOP proposed all four. See 161 CONG. REC.
S2104-05 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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the Ranking Member, that the absence of 2015 nominee votes
contravened precedent and contrasted with how Democrats scru-
tinized Bush picks.42 He asserted that the Senate's constitutional
responsibility to give "advice and consent" does not end with a
presidency's final two years and carefully urged swift authoriza-
tion of the Judicial Conference proposal for seventy-three judge-
ships to provide the bench resources for delivering justice." Leahy
responded to Grassley's idea that eleven nominees appointed in
the 2014 lame duck session must "count towards confirmations
this year" by arguing that prior "Congresses have always con-
firmed consensus nominees" ahead of lengthy recesses, maintain-
ing "Democrats were only forced to do so because Republican ob-
struction had left judicial vacancies close to [ninety across
"144Obama's] first six years.
McConnell failed to publicly say when the other three district
or five Court of Federal Claims aspirants would have votes.
Nonetheless, he confirmed one trial level re-nominee on April 20,
prompting Leahy's contention this was only the second appoint-
ment, which clearly proved that GOP "delay and obstruction" re-
vealed the earlier Obama years was continuing, and his denunci-
ation of the "slow trickle," which harms courts and the public.4"
When the Senate Republican leader denied rapid ballots for the
last two district re-nominees, Reid compared the pair of jurists
the GOP approved the entire year with sixteen over 2007, while
he mentioned twenty nominees were pending in committee,
emergencies doubled this year, and Republicans' disregard of
their constitutional responsibility was an "injustice to the Ameri-
can people." These efforts seemingly provoked McConnell to
42. 161 CONG. REC. S2029-30 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2015). They approved sixty-eight ju-
rists during Bush's last two years and fifteen by the end of March 2007, in contrast to
none in 2015. Id.
43. 161 CONG. REC. S2028-30 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2015); accord, id. at S2264 (daily ed.
Apr. 20, 2015); see U.S. JUDICIAL CONF. PROCEEDINGS 18 (2015). The courts' policymaking
arm bases proposals on conservative caseload estimates.
44. 161 CONG. REC. S2029-30 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2015). For consensus nominees' ap-
proval, see Goldman et al., supra note 3, at 13-14; Michael Shenkman, Decoupling District
from Circuit Judge Nominations: A Proposal to Put Trial Bench Nominations on Track, 65
ARK. L. REV. 217, 292 (2012). For the ninety vacancies idea, see ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL
VACANCIES, supra note 9; Goldman et al., supra note 3, at 13.
45. 161 CONG. REC. S2263-64 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 2015). Grassley said approving elev-
en judges in the 2014 lameduck session violated "standard practice." When they are in-
cluded, 2015 is like 2007. 161 CONG. REC. S2264 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 2015).
46. 161 CONG. REC. S2659 (daily ed. May 6, 2015). Continuing GOP inaction led Reid
to repeat the earlier concerns and focus on Texas's seven emergencies. Id. at S2949 (daily
2016]
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schedule floor consideration near the Memorial Day Recess for
the district re-nominees. In their debates, Leahy charged that
both persons enjoyed September nominations and January hear-
ings with unanimous February panel reports, yet had languished
on the floor for almost three months,47 contending Jose Olvera
would fill one of six district emergencies in Texas.4" He alleged
Republicans persistently tendered excuses for nominee obstruc-
tion49 and criticized their "delay for delay's sake" which miss[es]
the bigger picture" of the responsibility to fill openings."0 When
the Senate approved a lone nominee in July, Democrats pursued
multiple unanimous consent requests on votes that were denied."'
For example, Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) aptly contrasted the 2008
appointments results with this year, pleading for three designees'
consideration, but Grassley reiterated his notions about the 2014
lame duck session confirmations, which violated regular order,
and how this year was like 2007, urging his colleague to "put that
in your pipe and smoke it. '' "S
c. Summary
Despite repeated declarations of the regular order mantra by
prominent GOP leaders since winning the chamber, from early
January until April 12, 2015, they confirmed no district judges,
with only four ahead of July.53 Before June, the committee also
granted merely three hearings and one included two nominees;
the panel correspondingly allowed four district and five Court of
ed. May 18, 2015).
47. Id. at S3223 (daily ed. May 21, 2015).
48. It had eight openings at that time. 161 CONG. REc. S3223 (daily ed. May 21, 2015).
49. 161 CONG. REC. S3223 (daily ed. May 21, 2015). He refuted Grassley's claim that
only eighteen judges were confirmed in 2007, as they were held over from 2006, by urging
he failed to say nine judges "were not ... left pending" on the floor at 2006's end. Id. at
S3223 (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying notes 43-44; Editorial: Grassley
Joins Race to Bottom, DES MOINES REG. (Aug. 1, 2015), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/
story/opinioneditorials/2l5/07/31/grassley-joins-race-bttm-phlitical-rhetric30963785/.
50. 161 CONG. REC. S3223 (daily ed. May 21, 2015). After much home-state politician
praise, both nominees had 100-0 votes. Id. at S3223-24.
51. See 161 CONG. REC. 84678 (confirming the nomination of Kara Stoll).
52. 161 CONG. REC. S6151-52 (daily ed. July 30, 2015); see id. at 86999-7000 (daily
ed. Sept. 29, 2015) (Sen. Leahy summarizing dismal 2015 record, contrasted to 2007); id.
at S5047-48 (daily ed. July 14, 2015) (statement of Sen. Coons) (requesting unanimous
consent). But see id. at 85048-49 (statement of Sen. Cotton) (objecting).
53. ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES (2009-14), supra note 9.
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Claims re-nominees' ballots on February 26 and two more April
23." This desultory record contrasts with Democratic endeavors
in Obama's first six years and even over Bush's presidency; for
instance, the strongest precedents were thirty-four of his fine, un-
controversial recommendations for districts, who realized confir-
mation in 2007, and Democrats' systematic consideration of trial
jurists before lengthy recesses."
2. The Appellate Court Process
Both parties examine appellate nominees very closely because
the selections are comparatively fewer, while they articulate more
policy, which often has ideological effects. In November 2014,
Obama mustered nomination of Kara Farnandez Stoll to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and District Judge Luis
Felipe Restrepo to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit.56 He marshaled no other appellate designees, primarily be-
cause GOP senators represent most jurisdictions that have pre-
sent circuit vacancies without nominees, and they have
coordinated little.57 Stoll was an experienced, mainstream Federal
Circuit practitioner, and Restrepo is a stellar, centrist jurist, and
each is Latina/o.s Neither received Committee hearings in 2014,
as Obama proffered both following the 2014 elections.
54. See supra notes 30, 36, 38 and accompanying text (discussing delayed voting by
the judiciary committee in late 2014 and hearings conducted for nominees in March and
the summer of 2015); infra note 52 and accompanying text (noting that voting on nomi-
nees was again stalled in March 2015).
55. U.S. COURTS, ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES (2007), http://www.uscourts.
gov/judges-judgeships/judicialvacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies; 161 CONG. REC. S2029-
30 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Democrats' acts, such as using the
nuclear option, seemed to extend the "confirmation wars." See source cited supra notes 3,
12.
56. WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC'Y, President Obama Nominates Two to
Serve on the U.S. Courts of Appeals (Nov. 12, 2014); see U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL
VACANCIES: CURRENT JUDICIAL VACANCIES (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judge
ships/judicial-vacancies (noting Luis Felipe Restrepo as unconfirmed nominee to the Third
Circuit); U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL VACANCIES: CONFIRMATION LISTING (2015), http://www.
uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-listing (noting Kara Far-
nandez Stoll as confirmed appointee to the Federal Circuit); WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE
PRESS SECY, Presidential Nominations Sent to the Senate (Jan. 7, 2015).
57. Russell Wheeler, With Senate Control, Will the GOP Stop Confirming Circuit
Judges?, BROOKINGS: FixGOv BLOG (Nov. 16, 2015, 1:51 PM), http://www.brookings.edul
blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/06/1O-circuit-court-confirmations-wheeler; see Toobin, supra note
39; supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
58. See sources cited supra note 56.
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Stoll's March hearing proceeded smoothly,9 yet the panel only
voted her to the floor on April 23 where she languished for a
number of weeks.6" McConnell neglected to publicly declare when
the superior prospect would be considered, but on June 4, he sug-
gested that the GOP would halt final ballots on more Obama ap-
peals court nominees.6' After press outlets reported this idea, a
McConnell staffer proclaimed: "We're going to continue to do
judges. [There's] not a shutdown. We probably will have a circuit
court nominee.62
On June 8, Reid accused the Majority Leader with drastic ob-
struction-namely rejecting chamber ballots for appellate picks,
which contravened his duty-by invoking McConnell's floor
speeches that pled for quick votes on all Bush 2008 circuit selec-
tions, while Reid alleged the GOP had yet to confirm one appel-
late possibility-"not even a consensus nominee such as Kara
Stoll," and urged her prompt consideration.63 As the Senate de-
parted on the July 4 Recess without considering any person since
late May, Leahy protested the inactivity, canvassed the dismal
2015 results and demanded expeditious votes for those on the
floor, notably Stoll, which might have provoked her 95-0 July 7
ballot.64 If few circuit aspirants win confirmation, this would fla-
grantly violate regular order because that would be unprecedent-
ed, while the Democratic majority helped approve ten Bush cir-
cuit jurists his ending two years.65
59. Hearing on Judicial Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong.
(Mar. 11, 2015).
60. Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong.
(Apr. 23, 2015).
61. See Steve Benen, McConnell's Silent Governing Failure, MSNBC (June 5, 2015),
http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/mcconnells-silent-governing-failure; Nick
Gass, McConnell Vows to Slow Judicial Nominees, POLITICO (June 5, 2015), http:/! www.
politico.comlstory/2015/06/mitch-mcconnell-judicial-nominations-118674.
62. Alexander Bolton, McConnell Backs Away from Shutdown Talk, THE HILL (June
6, 2015), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/244196-mcconnell-backs-away-from-judicial-
shutdown-talk.
63. 161 CONG. REC. S3849-50 (daily ed. June 8, 2015).
64. 161 CONG. REC. S4591 (daily ed. June 24, 2015). Leahy reiterated much data and
the GOP duty. Id.; see supra notes 42-44, 50 and accompanying text; see also id. at S4678
(daily ed. July 7, 2015) (Stoll vote).
65. See supra notes 42, 46, 63-64 and accompanying text.
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Restrepo's process tellingly illuminates stalling, as the fine,
noncontroversial jurist waited more than 200 days for a hearing."
Obama chose Restrepo with the avid endorsement of Pennsylva-
nia Senators Bob Casey (D) and Pat Toomey (R).67 However, the
Committee only set a hearing for June 10, principally because
Toomey did not return his blue slip until May 14, although Casey
furnished his in November.8 Both Senators had previously desig-
nated Restrepo for the Eastern District bench, and the chamber
felicitously approved the selection in a June 2013 voice vote.69 The
legislators promoted his elevation with a strong press release in
which Toomey contended he would "make a superb addition to
the Third Circuit."7 Nevertheless, the aspirant was excluded from
a May hearing on four trial level prospects." The day before that
session, the press queried Toomey, who claimed he remained
supportive and confident about 2015 confirmation.2 Grassley
pledged he would set a hearing once Toomey provided the blue
slip.7" A panel aide said it was evaluating the nominee's back-
66. Benched! History Shows "Regular Order" Means Appellate Court Confirmations,
ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, http://www.afj.org/blogfbenched-history-shows-regular-order-mea
ns-appellate-court-confirmations (last visited Jan. 4, 2016).
67. Press Release, Office of Robert P. Casey, Jr., Casey, Toomey Applaud Nomination
of Judge Luis Felipe Restrepo to U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Nov. 12,
2014), http://www.casey.senate.gov/newsroom/releases/casey-toomey-applaud-nomination.
of-judge-luis-felipe-restrepo-to-us-court-of-appeals-for-the-third-circuit.
68. See 161 CONG. REC. S6369 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 2015). Saranac Spencer, Toomey
Submits Blue Slip, But Will Restrepo Get a Hearing?, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (May 19,
2015), http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/printerfriendly/id=1202726785818#; Jonathan
Tamari, A Judicial Nominee Waits; Toomey Gets Blamed, PHILA. INQUIRER (May 9, 2015),
http:/larticles.philly.com/2015-05-09news/61952388-1-toomey-luis-felipe-restrepo-
president-obama.
69. 159 CONG. REC. S4516 (daily ed. June 17, 2013); Spencer, supra note 68. He was
then a magistrate judge of this district. All modern Presidents elevate judges from lower
courts. Tobias, Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at 2258.
70. See Press Release, Office of Robert P. Casey, Jr., supra note 67.
71. No nominee was picked before him. Hearings on Judicial Nominees Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (May 6, 2015).
72. Jennifer Bendery, Pat Toomey Is Blocking His Own Judicial Nominee, for Some
Reason, HUFFINGTON POST (May 5, 2015) [hereinafter Bendery, Pat Toomey Is Blocking],
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/05/pat-toomey-luis-restrepo_n_7214790.html;
Tracie Mauriello, Confirmation Vote on Pennsylvania Jurist Awaits 'Blue Slip' From
Toomey, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (May 7, 2015), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/20
15/05/06/Toomey-holding-up-confirmation-of-Pennsylvania-jurist-he-supportsstories/2015
05060171; Saranac Spencer, Political Maneuvers Hold up Nominee for Third Circuit,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (May 6, 2015), http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=120272559
0790?keywords=Spencer+%22Political+maneuvers%22&publication=The+Legal+Intellig
encer.
73. Bendery, Pat Toomey Is Blocking, supra note 72; Mauriello, supra note 72. Grass-
ley's pledge and failure to broach an ongoing inquiry undercut Toomey's excuse for waiting
six months.
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ground under "regular order."74 On the chamber floor the day the
May hearing occurred, Reid deftly repeated Toomey's laudatory
descriptions of Restrepo while asking if Pennsylvanians wonder
why the lawmaker failed to explain the talented nominee's slow-
ing "by his own party."75
Toomey later denied he was stalling Restrepo, and declared the
committee was analyzing him but would only conduct a hearing
after that concluded and promised to return the blue slip then,
unless pertinent concerns surfaced."6 On May 14, Toomey yielded,
producing his blue slip, ostensibly due to the inquiry's end." The
June 10 panel hearing was seamless, as Toomey voiced powerful
support and Restrepo clearly answered questions. The candidate
was held over yet won approval on a July 9 unopposed voice
vote.79 Given how long most 2015 nominees waited coupled with
Grassley's July tirade and McConnell's cryptic discussion of his
74. Spencer, supra note 72 (emphasis added). She said members may hold blue slips
until vetting ends, as questions can arise in that process. Mauriello, supra note 72; accord
Jennifer Bendery, Pat Toomey Insists He's Not Holding up a Judicial Nominee He's Hold-
ing up, HUFFINGTON POST (May 13, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.comI2015/O5/13/pat-
toomey-judge-restrepo-n_7277332.html.
75. 161 CONG. REC. S2660 (daily ed. May 6, 2015); see Hearings on Judicial Nominees
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (May 6, 2015) (statement of Sen. Grass-
ley).
76. Pat Toomey, I Am Not Delaying Judge L. Felipe Restrepo, PITT. POST-GAZETTE
(May 18, 2015), http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/letters/2015/05/13/I-am-not-delaying-
Judge-L-Felipe-Restrepo-s-3rd-Circuit-nominationstries/201505130068; see Tamari,
supra note 68; see also supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (discussing Toomey's
claims that he remained supportive of Restrepo, despite his failure to return the blue slip).
77. Hearings on Judicial Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong.
(June 10, 2015); Tracie Mauriello, Toomey Signs Off On Nominee for Federal Appeals
Court, Pir. POST-GAZETTE (May 14, 2015), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/region/20
15/05/14Toomey-signs-off-on-nominee-for-federal-appeals-court/stories/201505140325;
Williams, The GOP's Judicial Logjam, supra note 8 (reiterating criticism of GOP for de-
lay).
78. Senators posing queries seemed satisfied. Hearings on Judicial Nominees Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (June 10, 2015); Hearing Examining the Fed-
eral Regulatory System to Improve Accountability, Transparency, and Integrity Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (June 10, 2015) (statement of Sen. Grassley urg-
ing 2015 circuit hearings and approvals to mirror 2007); Tracie Mauriello, After Hearing,
Philadelphia Judge Close to Third Circuit Confirmation, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (June 11,
2015), http://www.post-gazette.comnews/politics-nation/2015/06/11/After-hearing-Philadel
phia-judge-close-to-3rd-Circuit-confirmationstories/201506110112.
79. Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong.
(June 25, July 9, 2015); see Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 114th Cong. (Apr. 23, 2015); Executive Business Meeting Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 114th Cong. (Mar. 11, 2015).
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June 4 allusion to circuit votes, it is not surprising that Re-
strepo's final ballot was not conducted until January 11, 2016.80
No defensible idea supports Restrepo's protracted delay, be-
cause Obama first made the jurist's nomination in 2014 for an
emergency opening. His lengthy wait contrasts to Stoll, proposed
the same day, who had a March hearing and April Committee re-
port."' Observers also insistently contended partisanship ex-
plained slow processing.2
3. Summary of District and Appellate Processes
Reid and Leahy continuously and convincingly addressed
Grassley's claims with applicable data on confirmations and hear-
ings.3 The Chair's figures were rather persuasive, especially
when, for instance, he employed analogous metrics, but in some
respects they can lack pertinence, as data support numerous con-
cepts.8 4 Essential is assiduously fulfilling the constitutional duty
to express advice and consent and place talented, consensus as-
pirants in many vacancies, specifically emergencies.85 The most
relevant precedent is Democrats' 2007-08 effort, which confirmed
almost seventy Bush court picks." In sum, the 2015 processing
record-approving one circuit and ten trial jurists-sharply con-
trasts to Democrats' work at a comparable juncture.
80. 161 CONG. REC. S8443 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2015) (confirmation vote, but not Re-
strepo's); see John Tamari, Senate Schedules Vote on Long-Delayed Pa. Nominee Restrepo,
PHILA. INQUIRER (Dec. 9, 2015, 9:22 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/capitolinq/Sen
ate-schedules-vote-on-long-delayed-PA-nominee-Restrepo.html (confirming the agreement
on scheduling the January 11 vote); supra notes 59-64 (Stoll's wait); supra notes 44-50
(re-nominees with much GOP support took ninety days from panel to final votes).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45, 50. She lacked his prior full inquiry,
leaving unclear why he took 6 months, especially with his full 2013 canvass and later dis-
trict court service.
82. Merely four district judges won 2015 approval in contrast to Democrats' helping
confirm three circuit and fifteen district judges by April 2007. See 161 CONG. REC. S2104
(daily ed. Apr. 13, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy); Bendery, supra note 74.
83. See supra notes 33, 42-50 and accompanying text.
84. See Russell Wheeler, Confirming Federal Judges During the Final Two Years of
the Obama Administration: Vacancies up, Nominees down, BROOKINGS: FIxGov BLOG
(Aug. 18, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/08/18.obama-
federal-judges-confirmation-wheeler.
85. See supra notes 43, 46, 49, 63 and accompanying text. GOP senators proposed
many nominees. See 161 CONG. REC. S2104-05 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2015) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
86. Ten were circuit picks. See supra text accompanying note 42.
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II. THE REASONS FOR AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROBLEMATIC
SELECTION PROCESS
A. Reasons
The explanations for appointments' problematic condition are
complex. Scholars and politicians robustly debate whether selec-
tion has always been troubled,7 but a number trace the modern
"confirmation wars" to the pitched fight about Judge Robert
Bork's Supreme Court nomination three decades ago.8" Writers
contend the process is effectively on a downward trajectory sum-
marized by partisanship and serial obstruction in which the par-
ties ratchet down the regime, while both consider any concession
unilateral disarmament.s9 For example, the most recent iteration
derives from Republican accusations that Democrats stymied con-
firmations during the ending pair of Bush years and retaliated for
that with unprecedented stalling in Obama's tenure." Democratic
frustration eventually provoked the nuclear option's invocation
that spurred Republicans to contend Democrats had abrogated
the rules."s Mandating cloture on all prospects concomitantly
fueled Democrats' endeavors that rapidly approved numerous ju-
rists over 2014's lame duck session to which the GOP responded
by profoundly delaying 2015 choices.92 In short, rampant parti-
sanship and many severe paybacks seem to epitomize the process.
87. Michael Gerhardt & Michael Ashley Stein, The Politics of Early Justice: Federal
Judicial Selection, 1789-1861, 100 IOWA L. REV. 551, 553 (2015); Orrin Hatch, The Consti-
tution as the Playbook for Judicial Selection, 32 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1035, 1038-39
(2009); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Golden or Bronze Age of Judicial Selection?, 100
IOWA L. REV. BULLETIN 69, 70 (2015), http://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/files/ilr.law.uiowa.edu/files/
ILRB_100_Shugerman. pdf.
88. See generally ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION
SHOOK AMERICA (1989) (explaining that Robert Bork's nominations was contentious);
MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF AMERICA'S
REJECTION OF ROBERT BORK'S NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT (1992) (discussing the
epic struggle that took place between senators, the press, staff, and civil liberty organiza-
tions over Robert Bork's nomination).
89. Doug Kendall, The Bench in Purgatory: The New Republican Obstructionism on
Obama's Judicial Nominees, SLATE (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.slate.comarticles/news_
and_politics/jurisprudence/2009/10/the-bench-in.purgatory.html.
90. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 14-83 and accompanying text.
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B. Implications
2015 inaction leaves the courts with seventy-one Article III
judgeships empty, while the AO identifies emergencies for thirty-
two circuit and district court positions, a statistic which Republi-
cans permitted to double since January, including the vacancy
that Restrepo could fill.93 Open posts were essentially at ninety
for much of the five years which commenced in August 2009; the
courts were only able to experience the comparatively low figure
of seventy-one vacancies after Democrats had unleashed the nu-
clear option which prevented Republicans from mounting success-
ful filibusters.94 However, 2015 inactivity can yield one hundred
openings and perhaps fifty emergencies next year.
Slow confirmations have many deleterious impacts." They re-
quire fine, uncontroversial nominees to place lives and careers on
hold and dissuade myriad remarkable candidates from entertain-
ing bench service.9" Protracted Senate assessment deprives tribu-
nals of judicial resources which they critically need, impedes
prompt, economical and fair case disposition, imposes substan-
tially greater pressure on already overburdened jurists and com-
pels litigants to wait years on resolution.97 These detrimental ef-
fects have also undermined citizen regard for selection and the
government's coordinate branches." The above propositions sug-
gest that proposals for improving confirmations warrant scrutiny.
93. FEDERAL JUDICIAL VACANCIES (2015), supra note 56; 161 CONG. REC. S2029-30
(daily ed. Mar. 26, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see Joe Palazzolo, In Federal Courts,
the Civil Cases Pile up, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-federal-
courts-civil-cases-pile-up- 1428343746.
94. See sources cited supra notes 12-14, 39, 44.
95. See Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at 2253; 161 CONG. REC. S3223 (daily ed. May
21, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
96. Kendall, supra note 89; Todd Ruger, Nominees Are Living on Hold, NAT'L L. J.
(Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202581557603/Nominees-are-liv
ing-on-hold?slreturn=20151106194656/; see Andrew Cohen, In Pennsylvania, the Human
Costs of Judicial Confirmation Delays, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 9, 2012), http://www.theatlan
tic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/in-pennsylvania-the-human-costs-of-judicial-confirmation-
delays/261862/.
97. See U.S. COURTS, YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7-8 (2010); id.
(1997, 2002); Tobias, Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at 2253; Jennifer Bendery, Federal
Judges Are Burned Out, Overworked and Wondering Where Congress Is, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/judge-federal.courts-vacancies
_55d77721e4b0a40aa3aafl4b; Wheeler, supra note 84.
98. See Cohen, supra note 96 (explaining the "real-life consequences of delay" due to
"justice delayed syndrome"); Palazzolo, supra note 93 (noting citizens' discontent with civil
cases piling up due to slow judicial appointment process); Ruger, supra note 96 (describing
judicial appointment delay as having large impact on public).
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III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The appointment of merely eleven court nominees in 2015 and
other problematic phenomena show that the process will face se-
rious complications over the 2016 presidential election year. Most
important, approvals can gradually slow and come to a halt, and
the judiciary could have nearly one hundred unfilled positions,
almost half emergencies, were 2015 inaction to continue. Accord-
ingly, Obama, the chamber, and members should now pledge to
fulfill the shared constitutional duty for appointments, thus
providing the bench sufficient resources to deliver justice, with
meaningful cooperation throughout the nomination and confirma-
tion procedures. GOP senators and party leaders ought to effec-
tuate the regular order construct again by carefully deploying
multiple ideas used at the close of Bush's Administration, reinsti-
tuting strategies that expedite consideration and formulating new
promising concepts, which directly fill the ample vacancies with
highly qualified centrists.9
All selection participants must canvass and implement numer-
ous ways of ending or tempering the "confirmation wars." Inte-
gral will be stopping or ameliorating the vicious cycle of paybacks
and strident, counterproductive partisanship which the majority's
rhetoric and corresponding delay exemplify, namely the June
suggestion by McConnell that few appellate nominees would re-
ceive confirmation and Grassley's petulant July denial of cham-
ber votes until fall. Strikingly ironic about 2015 GOP conduct was
the failure to even match approvals in numbers of recent presi-
dential election years."'
A. Selection in Modern Presidential Election Years
Because 2016 is one such year, for which peculiar conventions
have developed, relatively diverse approaches could enjoy success.
A major tradition has been that the nomination and confirmation
processes slow, particularly at second terms' conclusion, and ul-
timately grind to a halt.'° This custom is mainly based on respect
99. For many specific ideas, see Shenkman, supra note 44, at 298-311; Tobias, Senate
Gridlock, supra note 3, at 2255-65.
100. See 161 CONG. REC. S3849-50 (daily ed. June 8, 2015) (statement of Sen. Reid);
Carl Tobias, Filling Judicial Vacancies in a Presidential Election Year, 46 U. RICH. L. REV.
985, 996 (2012); Everett & Kim, supra note 38.
101. DENIS STEVEN RuTKus & KEVIN M. SCOTT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NOMINATION
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for voter preferences expressed in the November elections and for
incoming chief executives and senators, who deserve the oppor-
tunity to proffer candidates and contribute advice and consent.
The tradition has allowed consideration of many accomplished,
consensus trial level nominees into most autumns but rarely
through lame duck sessions. For example, the chamber approved
twenty-two Bush pare choices in 1992 after June; seventeen of
President Bill Clinton's over 1996 following June with eight after
June 2000; a pair of Bush submissions later than June in 2004
combined with eight recommendations after this month over
2008; and fourteen Obama candidates across 2012.102 Those data
could reveal Democratic Presidents' nominees fared better, yet
many variables such as nomination timing, which party held a
chamber majority and the review's narrow scope, complicate
analysis."3
The tradition concomitantly permits strong, moderate appel-
late nominees to garner votes past the Memorial Day Recess, but
occasionally later. A dramatic illustration was Stephen Breyer
whose First Circuit nomination Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) persuad-
ed Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) to promote after Ronald Reagan's
1980 defeat of President Jimmy Carter.' More recently, the Sen-
ate approved eleven Bush pre circuit aspirants during 1992 (six
following June); two of Clinton's in January 1996 with eight
across 2000 (one later than June); while five Bush choices won
approval over 2004 and four were confirmed in 2008 (none after
that month either year).0 5 Five Obama 2012 jurists were appoint-
ed, but no candidate after mid-June."' These figures show that
AND CONFIRMATION OF LOWER FEDERAL COURT JUDGES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEARS
(2008); Russell Wheeler, Judicial Confirmations: What Thurmond Rule?, 45 BROOKINGS 1
(Mar. 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/papers/2012/3/judicial.wheel
er/03_judicial wheeler.pdf.
102. U.S. COURTS, ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008,
2012), http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/ udicialvacancies/archive-judicial-vacan
cies; id. (2002, 2010, 2014) (approving 20 Bush, and 19 and 23 Obama, picks in mid-term
lame duck sessions); ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES, supra note 9; Wheeler, supra note
101.
103. Wheeler, supra note 101, at 4 (identifying variables); see RUTKUS & SCOTT, supra
note 101, at 3-4, 51-53.
104. SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES 261 (1997); RUTKUS & SCOTT, su-
pra note 101, at 7-8.
105. U.S. COURTS, ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008),
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/j udicialvacancies/archive-judicial.vacancies;
Wheeler, supra note 101.
106. McConnell agreed on no final votes after June 12, making five able, consensus
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both parties' nominees met similar resistance, yet the GOP needs
to greatly enhance the pace should it hope to equal the late Bush
years' performance.
In short, much consensus attends the conventions that nomina-
tion and confirmation processes slow and eventually halt in pres-
idential election years, while circuit appointments conclude soon-
er, involving fewer approvals. However, considerable disagree-
ment remains about the traditions' exact contours, including
when appointments could taper off and stop, while McConnell re-
cently conceded that "there isn't any particular official or unoffi-
cial cutoff date."'' 7 Those phenomena explain why the customs
apparently have been different over time, honored in the breach
and employed to capture partisan advantage.
B. Traditional Selection Measures
In this milieu, numerous tools can apply with more or less suc-
cess. Politicians ought to seriously consider reinstituting a num-
ber of traditional measures, which proved efficacious during the
last two Bush years, but that achieved checkered 2015 results
witnessed by GOP inactivity."°8 General examples abound. The
President should continue assiduously consulting and quickly
nominating prominent, mainstream candidates whom numerous
home state officers diligently propose. Lawmakers must again re-
spect the convention of abundantly deferring to home state col-
leagues and Obama, who has cultivated the legislators, heeded
their preferences and sent a number of people Republicans ten-
dered or whom they favored."0 9 Other general customs are the du-
ties to keep moving able, consensus suggestions at a presidency's
close and voting on cohorts of the aspirants near recesses, yet
these conventions seem to be honored in the breach, and the 2015
picks wait until 2013. See ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES (2012), supra note 9; infra text
accompanying note 119.
107. Jennifer Bendery, Mitch McConnell Will Finally Let Some Judges Get Confirmed
Next Year, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 15, 2015, 7:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.coml
entry/republicans-obama-judicial-nominees_567055e0e4b0e292150f6690; see RUTKUS &
SCOTT, supra note 101, at 3-4, 51-53; Wheeler, supra note 101, at 1.
108. The GOP must expedite with more hearings and faster panel and floor votes on
consensus nominees. See infra notes 132-36. However, 2015 inaction shows the ideas lack
promise for 2016. See supra notes 52, 61.
109. Goldman et al., supra note 3, at 16-17; Carl Tobias, Justifying Diversity in the
Federal Judiciary, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 283, 296 (2012). GOP senators who differ
with Obama can suggest preferable choices.
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experience in Committee, but particularly on the floor, was un-
promising.1'
Many specific notions also could apply. The President should
even more insistently consult senators from jurisdictions where
open posts surface to accelerate nominations' pace. Those officials
must supplement cooperation by especially promptly submitting
numerous accomplished, uncontroversial prospects.' Merit selec-
tion panels, which canvass, interview and effectively choose ap-
plicants for vacant court seats in Pennsylvania, Texas, and other
states have provided help, but the commissions and lawmakers
whom they advise can act slowly.' 2 Thus, politicians need to
closely scrutinize diverse, promising models, such as the Califor-
nia and Wisconsin panels that efficiently yielded numerous capa-
ble aspirants over Bush's tenure,"' while concomitantly fine-
tuning initiatives.
Senators also could move very expeditiously when judges prof-
fer notice of intent to assume senior status and cautiously antici-
pate future empty positions by, for instance, respectfully com-
municating with jurists once they become eligible."' Another
concept is a mechanism enlisted in states that possess split dele-
gations, notably Pennsylvania, which enables the senator from
that party lacking the White House to submit able candidates.11'
Other profitable solutions include presenting Obama multiple
submissions and clearly ranking preferences, which enlarge his
flexibility and cabin the necessity to start anew when Obama dif-
fers on the lone pick sent, a luxury the United States cannot af-
ford in presidential election years.1 '
110. See supra notes 28-54, 57, 60-86, 108 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 3-4, 21-27 and accompanying text.
112. Jessica M. Karmasek, Members of Texas Judicial Evaluation Committee An-
nounced, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Apr. 17, 2013), http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510515096-
members-of-texas-judicial-evaluation-committee-announced; Borys Krawczeniuk, Toomey,
Casey Unveil Selection Process for Federal Judges, STANDARD SPEAKER (Apr. 27, 2011),
http://standardspeaker.com/news/toomey-casey-unveil-selection-process-for-federal-judges-
1.1138220; see supra note 24; see also supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
113. Tobias, Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at 2256. But see ARCHIVE OF JUDICIAL
VACANCIES (2010-15), supra notes 9, 56 (showing Wis. 7th Cir. vacancy open since 2010).
114. 28 U.S.C.A. § 371 (2012) (eligible if sixty-five and fifteen years service); see David
Stras & Ryan Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453 (2007);
Tobias, Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at 2256.
115. Toomey picks one in four whom Casey and he suggest. PENNSYLVANIANS FOR
MODERN COURTS, Western District May Be Filled in 2015 (Mar. 2015); see supra note 69;
sources cited infra note 142.
116. GOP senators more often send one. Joseph Morton, Obama Nominates Omaha
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If GOP lawmakers remain unreceptive to White House cultiva-
tion by acting slowly or forwarding minuscule possibilities,
117
Obama could designate with no Republican delegation support;
however, this proves unproductive."' The Administration can also
strike compromises about the kind of accomplished, moderate
nominees whom Obama prefers. For example, he could rely more
upon diversity vis-a-vis (1) age by championing older selections,
as with Circuit Judge Andrew Hurwitz, the last 2012 confirmee;"'
(2) ideology or party affiliation, especially Republicans or Inde-
pendents, namely a few Toomey candidates;2° (3) experience, such
as prosecutors or civil defense lawyers;2' and (4) confirming ad-
ministration, specifically Bush, with Circuit Judge Henry Floyd's
elevation.2 All modern Presidents capitalize on the last tradi-
tion. 23 For instance, Obama has aptly nominated some of his low-
er court appointees, like Judges Gregg Costa and Robert Wil-
kins,124 and even certain jurists three predecessors approved, a
dynamic gesture of bipartisanship.21 Obama might correspond-
ingly invoke "trades," which he apparently employed in filling
lengthy Georgia vacancies.'26 Obama can as well use confronta-
tional tools, which hold senators responsible by publishing the
Attorney Rossiter to Federal Bench in Nebraska, OMAHA WORLD HERALD (June 12, 2015),
http://www.omaha.com/news/crime/obama-nominates-omaha-attorney-rossiter-to-federal-
bench-in-nebraskaarticle_7517dc5c-1084-11e5-9f03-eb447e9aaa07.html. But see Tobias,
Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at 2251.
117. See supra notes 4, 22-26 and accompanying text.
118. He rarely uses it, as home state GOP members can retain blue slips and end pro-
cessing. Goldman et al., supra note 3, at 16-18; Tobias, Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at
2261; see supra notes 65, 71-72, 75-76.
119. 158 CONG. REC. S4108 (daily ed. June 12, 2012) (Hurwitz was sixty-six); 149
CONG. REC. S12,127 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2003) (Carlos Bea was sixty-eight when Bush
tapped him).
120. See, e.g., 158 CONG. REC. S8380 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2012) (Judge Matthew Brann);
160 CONG. REC. S1747 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2014) (Judge Edward Smith).
121. For appointee experiential data, see ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, BROADENING THE
BENCH (2015).
122. 157 CONG. REC. S6027 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2011). Obama elevated Justice Sonia So-
tomayor, whom Bush pare named to the S.D.N.Y. and Clinton elevated to the Second Cir-
cuit. 155 CONG. REC. S9063 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 2009); 138 CONG. REC. S12,417 (daily ed.
Aug. 11, 1992); 144 CONG. REC. S11,310 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1998).
123. Tobias, Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at 2258; see supra notes 68-69, 122 and ac-
companying text.
124. 160 CONG. REC. S283 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2014) (Wilkins); id. at 83125 (daily ed.
May 20, 2014) (Costa).
125. For example, Bush appointed Floyd, and Bush pere and Clinton named So-
tomayor. See supra note 122.
126. That was controversial. See supra note 26; Tobias, Senate Gridlock, supra note 3,
at 2251 (nominating from state in a circuit other than one where a vacancy occurs, as this
is a custom, not a rule). But see 28 U.S.C.A. § 44(c) (Supp. 2014).
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status of pre-nomination negotiations or mustering nominations
for all open slots, which could dramatize and publicize how chron-
ic vacancies eviscerate justice."7
Obama should in turn expedite the process before and once
home state politicians send choices. Illustrative would be accord-
ing nominations higher priority or greater resources."' Moreover,
the chief executive should hasten American Bar Association can-
didate analyses, Federal Bureau of Investigation background
checks, and White House evaluations and nominations of the per-
sons selected.'29 The President also must continue seeing ideology
narrowly and emphasizing merit by comprehensively pursuing
and naming superb, mainstream nominees."' Because most of his
prospects have been competent and uncontroversial, Obama
should not have to choose between proposing the type of submis-
sions whom he prefers and filling court vacancies at 2016's com-
mencement, as that salutary custom has governed early in many
Presidents' eighth year, a system which the Bush initiative epit-
omizes.'
For its part, the Committee should provide greater numbers of
hearings with more nominees while offering faster discussions
and ballots.'32 The Committee ought to survey additional produc-
tive notions that foster comparatively efficient review. A helpful
approach, which Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) practiced when Judiciary
Chair during the Bush years, was mounting abbreviated hearings
for talented, centrist nominees."3 One illustration of this measure
was the June 10 session for Restrepo and two district nominees,
which entailed less than one hour with probing queries and
frank, complete responses."' Another solution that merits careful
127. Shenkman, supra note 44, at 299-300; Tobias, Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at
2261; supra note 118.
128. Goldman et al., supra note 3, at 11-13; see Tobias, Senate Gridlock, supra note 3,
at 2250-51.
129. A study found the many steps take time. See Gordon Bermant et al., Judicial Va-
cancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 Miss. C. L. REV. 319,
332-333 (1994); Tobias, Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at 2235.
130. Tobias, Filling Judicial Vacancies in a Presidential Election Year, supra note 100,
at 995.
131. See supra notes 9, 44; see also supra text accompanying notes 102, 105.
132. See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
133. Tobias, Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at 2263; Neil A. Lewis, Senate Panel Backs
Appeals Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/30/
politics/30CND-JUDG.html.
134. Hearings on Judicial Nominees Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong.
2016]
58 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 50:35
investigation would be holding discussions and votes the first
time the panel considers nominees, specifically for emergencies,
rather than delaying them a week, as happened with more than
350 Obama candidates, in particular Restrepo.136
The Majority Leader needs to substantially expand floor de-
bates and ballots. For instance, he could reestablish a valuable
procedure which Democrats applied over Bush's concluding years:
having final votes regarding every strong, moderate district nom-
inee on the floor before prolonged recesses, as Leahy cogently
urged, and maybe clear them near the 2016 Memorial Day, July
4, or August Recesses.13 s McConnell concomitantly ought to illu-
minate his June discussion of appellate candidates, because ap-
pointing very small numbers over a President's last years would
be unprecedented.'37 Should he remain unresponsive, Democrats
can attempt protesting with unanimous consent requests to hold
expeditious final votes, which succinctly publicize and dramatize
obstruction's harmful impacts, yet Republicans flatly denied two
reasonable July 2015 Democratic petitions urging floor ballots on
138recommendations.
C. Pragmatic Politics
Even if the constitutional duty of furnishing advice and consent
and the responsibility to a coordinate branch for delivering ade-
quate judicial resources do not persuade the GOP to collaborate
more, some pragmatism, self-interest and political realities
should dictate compliance with numerous traditional, modest ap-
proaches. For example, the party's sizeable presidential field in-
spires little confidence that anyone from this group will become
the next chief executive, while over 2016 Republicans will defend
twice as many chamber seats as the opposition.139 These prognos-
(June 10, 2015); supra text accompanying note 29; Shenkman, supra note 44, at 303-05
(urging abolishing hearings that add little substance and changing questionnaires to omit
"completeness traps").
135. See supra notes 6, 34-37, 80 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 44, 46-47.
137. He did allow Stoll's July 7 final vote. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying
text.
138. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. If delay persists, Democrats can apply
rather dramatic, confrontational notions. Obama may use the bully pulpit to hold the GOP
accountable. Senators might protest with panel session boycotts. See supra notes 105, 109;
infra note 145 and accompanying text.
139. Chris Cillizza, 10 Senate Seats Most Likely to Switch Parties in 2016, WASH. POST
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tications suggest, for instance, that Republicans could prefer a
number of the fine, mainstream nominees Obama will marshal at
his tenure's conclusion to submissions whom a new Democratic
President might appoint, especially should Republicans not main-
tain the chamber. If the GOP wins the presidency, the figures
above show Democrats will probably capture the Senate, which
means the less the Republican party cooperates now the more
likely that action will spark Democratic conduct as problematic or
worse once 2017 begins.1
4
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D. More Dramatic, Controversial Approaches
Nevertheless, were GOP senators to resist Democrats' over-
tures or reject collaboration, Obama may actually consider addi-
tional dramatic, controversial alternatives. He can rely on the
bully pulpit to hold GOP legislators accountable for slowly choos-
ing picks, tendering few aspirants or delaying the confirmation
regime following nomination or make openings an election is-
sue.' The chief executive and lawmakers can agree to drastically
revamp the system through inauguration of a bipartisan judiciary
whereby the party lacking executive control might designate spe-
cific percentages of nominees, a technique several legislators have
adopted. 4 Congress may package this idea with bills authorizing
seventy-three judgeships, which could take effect over 2017, thus
advantaging neither party.1
(June 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/1O-senate-races-most-likely-to-sw
itch-parties-in-2016-elections/2015/06/07/d9215fbc-Od13-1 1e5-9726-49d6fa26a8c6_story.
html; Heather Haddon, Presidential Battle Fuels Republican Worries over Senate, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 23, 2015, 7:41 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/presidential-battle-fuels-rep
ublican-worries-over-senate-1450917553; James Hohmann & Elise Viebeck, Trump Leads
in Polls Because GOP Primary Voters Don't Value Electability, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/08/04/the-daily-202-trump-lead
s-in-polls-because-gop-primary-voters-dont-value-electability/.
140. Even if Republicans win the presidency and chamber, Democrats may adopt pay-
back strategies akin to concepts the GOP used in Obama's first six years. See supra notes
3-83 and accompanying text.
141. See David Stras & Ryan Scott, Navigating the New Politics of Judicial Appoint-
ments, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1869, 1902-06 (2008) (discussing the benefits of "going public"
and using the "bully pulpit" to ensure a smooth path to confirmation for judicial nomi-
nees); Tobias, Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at 2261.
142. See Michael Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 688
(2003); Carl Tobias, Postpartisan Federal Judicial Selection, 51 B.C. L. REV. 769, 790
(2010); supra text accompanying notes 68, 115.
143. Tobias, Filling the D.C. Circuit Vacancies, supra note 12, at 140; supra note 43
and accompanying text. If selection fails to improve, more judgeships will not help.
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If the situation becomes egregious, comparatively radical de-
vices might be indicated. For example, Obama always can recess
appoint designees, yet he wisely refrained from capitalizing on
that notion because thorny legal and political concerns trouble
the solution's application.' Democratic members could also boy-
cott committee nomination hearings and meetings, while the cau-
cus may analogously treat chamber floor activity, thereby con-
founding attempts to conduct panel and Senate business."'
E. The Judiciary
Finally, the Constitution assigns the political branches greater
responsibility for selection than the courts, but they might apply
numerous mechanisms. For instance, Chief Justices William
Rehnquist and John Roberts deployed Year-End Reports to ex-
plain how openings directly undercut the courts and harm liti-
gants while reprimanding both parties for stalling confirma-
tions.'46 Individual jurists or the bench as a whole, through
entities, notably the Judicial Conference, may publicly and dra-
matically register opposition to delay in selection. For example,
particular jurists or institutions have criticized, and should con-
tinue emphasizing, the pressures which numbers of vacancies
impose and even testify before Congress or lobby it and each leg-
islator on matters like increased judgeships.' Nonetheless, cer-
tain actions might elicit concerns about separation of powers or
judicial independence, specifically over the presidential election
148year.
144. Stras & Scott, supra note 141, at 1906; Senate Gridlock, supra note 3, at 2261.
145. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. These may slow Obama nominees.
146. YEAR-END REPORTS, supra note 97.
147. See supra notes 44, 97, 143 and accompanying text. Some judges enjoy cordial re-
lations with senators and urge them to fill vacancies. Tobias, Filling Judicial Vacancies in
a Presidential Election Year, supra note 100, at 1003.
148. Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
315, 316-17 (1999); see Tobias, Filling the Judicial Vacancies in a Presidential Election
Year, supra note 100, at 1002. Unorthodox ideas, such as changing life tenure or electing
judges, can apply but need legislation or constitutional amendment and, thus, are not fea-
sible for 2016. Carl Tobias, Dear President Bush: Leaving a Legacy on the Federal Bench,
42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1041, 1054 (2008).
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CONCLUSION
If minuscule 2015 confirmations-resembling the few approv-
als seen during presidential election years-represent he new
majority's definition of regular order, this nascent leadership in-
spires de minimis confidence about 2016 court appointments. Es-
pecially ironic has been that the regular order trope suffuses
much GOP discourse, even while the party has continued to un-
dermine this order in the approval system. Recalcitrance and not
honoring the chamber's duty have acutely undercut the coordi-
nate judiciary's attempts to fulfill essential constitutional respon-
sibilities. Thus, during 2016, Obama and senators must again
implement regular order derived from traditions used over recent
presidential election years, namely district confirmations until
autumn and the conventional appointments record compiled
across 2007-08. Only then may the courts better deliver justice.

